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Medicaresubsidizes the purchase of health services by elderly
persons. This paper supposes that several insurance alternatives
may be compared, or experience monitored, using a social welfare
function that recognizes gains from risk spreading, cash transfers,
and improved health statns. A particular measure of welfare gain,
an "equivalent transfer," is derived and applied to the Medicare
experience.
Econometric analysis suggests that, owing to Medicare, some
improvement in mortality and disability is evident in 1969.
Whether these health improvements are "large" is a question for
statistical hypothesis testing, but also it is a tractable question of
parameter values in the equivalent transfer formula.
1. INTRODUCTION
Medicareis one of several conceivable programs for improving the
opportunity for elderly persons to spread individual monetary risk.
365
jEach elderly person, under Medicare, is partially reimbursed for It is
certain expenses in what may be called a system of matching grants the ground
conditional on validation by physicians and other health profes- these alter
sionals. A matching grant, instead of a more neutral cash transfer, is program fo
a natural instrument of policy by a central authority wishing to for reimbu
partly overrule individually perceived values.' prejudging
This paper formulates the assessment of Medicare and some effective.
limited alternatives by a central authority. Individual risk prefer- keeping
ence and individual valuation of cash transfers are to be honored, seeking m
but the improvement of health status is taken to be a matter for
outside valuation.2 The relevance of such a formulation for applied
welfare analysis will be briefly discussed in this section. Then in
Section 2 a particular measure of welfare gain, an "equivalent
transfer," is derived. The application of this measure to monitoring 2. A NORM4
theearly results of Medicare is sketched. The next two sections of ASSESSI
thepaper apply econometric models for estimating improvements
associated with Medicare in mortality and disability.
S Thecentra
The problem for statistical inference is the adequate specification of
and testing of stochastic disturbance properties of age-specific monetary
rates. Each age-specific mortality rate should not be treated as an levels of F
independent time series, since over time different individuals are derive a m
observed, with different histories appearing elsewhere in the data. the above
A related shortcoming is inherent in the cohort approach of equivalel
epidemiology—technology is dated in time, affecting different programs
cohorts at different ages. These two observations motivate the equivalent
statistical tests in Section 3. Mortality rates for ages in five-year function.
intervals, and for years at five-year intervals ending in 1969, suggest Econom
a significant improvement for elderly white males associated with the inform
Medicare. The result for older white women is less clear. Disability for a deci
rates for both elderly men and elderly women over the period
1959-1971 show meaningful improvements relative to younger per- political r
sons.3Whether health gains are substantial is a question for statisti- limited to
cal hypothesis testing and also a tractable question of parameter program Ii
values in the equivalent transfer formula.
S Moreimp
The volumes of expert testimony and position papers during the if costs o
early 1960s indicate that the purchase of additional medical care for drastically
the elderly was regarded as a key social goal.4 Such a goal is does not
furthered more by Medicare than by either of the two following would be
insurance alternatives: (1) A floor on disposable income for we i
nonhealth consumption, implemented by a subsidy with a means comparin
test; (2) A system of cash indemnities that "compensates" for health applies to




367 MiIt is possible to criticize either of the insurance alternatives on
the grounds of practicality or human dignity. In addition, neither of
these alternatives offer the potential leverage of a reimbursement
program for promoting efficient supplier behavior. Finally, the case
for reimbursement contracts can be advanced directly, without
prejudging whether experience indicates such contracts to be cost
effective. The premise is that the high cost to a consumer of
keeping well informed about health leads to overly long delays in
seeking medical attention.
2.A NORMATIVE MODEL FOR QUANTITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF MEDICARE
Thecentral features of Medicare to be treated here are (1) a transfer
of resources to the elderly; (2) a presumably better spreading of
monetary risk among the elderly; (3) presumably better average
levels of health for the elderly. The purpose of this section is to
derive a measure of welfare change that combines information on
the above three phenomena. measure may be called an
"equivalent transfer" and may be used to compare hypothetical
programs or to monitor the welfare change of a given program. The
equivalent transfer is derived with a particular social welfare
function.
Economists use a social welfare function (SWF) to specify exactly
the information and ethical prescriptions that seem to be relevant
for a decision by some absolute authority. The SWF may be
completely irrelevant for understanding or participating in the
political process of voting. The economic content of voting is
limited to the self-interest of each and every person who votes. A
program like Medicare has an effect on persons who do not vote.5
More important, Medicare seems appropriate for the SWF approach
if costs of information about the efficacy of medical care are
drastically lower for a central planning authority.6 The use of a SWF
does not prejudge whether, as a result, a reimbursement program
would be found inferior to cash indemnity insurance.
If we ignore program features that involve redistributing or
comparing the preferences of different individuals, the SWF
applies to a representative individual. Analyses containing this
limitation have become conventional in the context of intertem-
poral and life-cycle phenomena.










































The representative individual is here assumed to be required to in situatioi
save out of his current income while young, building up a sum of factor in th
money, G. At a critical age, the saving ends and the individual Further
receives an annuity together with a reimbursement contract for the aversion. 1
purchase of medical services. At this critical age, the future con- sion will b
sumption of other goods and services per period is determined by (3) (c)=1
the following variables:
whereRis
y =annuityincome, plus actuarial value of the government reimburse- is now poss ment per year
z =out-of-pocket("direct") expense on covered medical services, a to obtain
random variable
=premiumcharges per year for health insurance plus the actuarial (4) = —
valueof government reimbursement
c =consumptionof goods and services other than medical care.
This spe
From the above, assuming no borrowing or lending, cash transf
(1) = — — Forconsta
and c is a random variable.7 The number of future periods that the
individual will enjoy, and his health status while alive, are obvious dw
concerns to him. In this analysis, however, a planning authority will
be assumed to partially overrule individual valuation of medical There is
services and health. in the rang
Define T to be an average health status variable perceived by the cal 1 per
planning authority and assume that u (c) is a function that displays K =0.1.N
the individual's degree of risk aversion, given typii
The function T[u(c)], which is a product of expectations, will For corn
be taken as the social perception of individual welfare at the critical z1 distribu
age. This objective function is assumed to be unique except for security (s
origin and scale. It preserves the degree of risk aversion displayed the z2 disti
by u. The variable T may be interpreted as the effective number of that direci
periods in which E [u (c)J is enjoyed.8 This objective function is premium
somewhat analogous to the human capital criterion of benefits from nents of i
healthprograms.9 previous
Suppose that two programs, labeled 1 and 2, or two situations average pe/
(say,before and after Medicare), are to be compared. Required elderly wi
changes in the quantity of saving before retirement will be ignored Medicare i
in the welfare comparison. A measure of the welfare gain to the cash trans
elderly for situation 2 is the "equivalent transfer" r defined by premiums
(2) T2.E{U(C2— T)]— T1.E[u (ci)]
The measure Tisthe amount of nonrnedical consumption whose reimburse
loss in situation 2 leaves the objective function at the same value as Conceiv
368 Friedman 369 Min situation 1. The introduction of an arbitrary constant or scale
factor in the objective function would not change r.'°
Furtheranalysis ofT depends on a parametric specification of risk
aversion. The following function with constant absolute risk aver-
sion will be assumed:
(3)u(cj=1—exp
where R is the parameter measuring the degree of risk aversion." It
is now possible to solve (2), letting eT2/T, andK =ern"-ITI)E(eRz),
to obtain
This specific measure provides a means for comparing dollars of
cash transfer with relative improvement in average health status.'2




Thereis some evidence that plausible values for R currently lie
in the range to 10-s. Consider R =5 Then a hypotheti-
cal 1 per cent improvement in health status raises r by $172 at
K =0.1.Notice that relatively small values of K are appropriate
given typical values of R and y,.
For comparisons with and without Medicare, information on the
z, distribution may be obtained from a 1962 survey by social
security (see Epstein and Murray, 1967). Complete information on
the z2 distribution is not readily available, although it is presumed
that direct cost risk has been greatly reduced.'3 The increased
premium cost —ir, hasbeen rather high. There are two compo-
nents of ir,, previous public reimbursement and the cost of
previous private insurance. According to Cooper et al. (1973),
average per capita reimbursement under all public programs to the
elderly was $131 in fiscal 1966, and it rose to $498 in fiscal 1969.
Medicare is a program for which 112—= — thereis no lump
cash transfer. There is an indirect cash transfer, that portion of
premiums ir1 —representing previous private insurance that is
discontinued. This transfer may be guessed for 1966 by using the
benefit ratio for all private insurance, which implies an average
reimbursement to the elderly of
Conceivable alternative programs could use a lower ir2, say
369
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byreimbursing only "catastrophes" and in addition raise cash
benefits towith the same total cost if —Y2 =— ire. Whether
such a strategy would promote much less average health improve-
ment is a key question. The rest of this paper will concentrate on








This section deals with a test of whether there was a biased share of d
improvement in U.S. mortality after 1966—i-biased in favor of arthritis,
persons over age 65. A specification of the statistical properties of mean sta)
aggregate mortality is applied to the data classified by year, 1934— personalil
1969, and by age, 35 and over in five-year age intervals. The
statistical specification is an application of econometric methods mortality
that does not seem common in mortality studies. The deterministic Recent
core of the model is the Gompertz view of the aging process after gional vai
maturity, known in demography since 1825. ferences
Causality cannot be established at the level of aggregation used racial coi
here. The more modest objective of a model is to monitor some ences in'
potentially stable relationship suggested by firmer knowledge at a estimate
lower level. For a particular disease process, a reimbursement expendit
program like Medicare would promote earlier treatment and more in absolu
intensive consumption of medical services.'5 When health results seems to
are compared for different dates in time, technological or environ- significai
mental change may swamp the price effects. The inference of ing for h
technical change from the stochastic properties of an otherwise The qi
stationary relationship is nothing new in econometrics.'6 not seem
Per capita expenses on personal health care for the elderly rose
* mortality
from $440 in fiscal 1966 to $720 in fiscal 1969, a gain of 64 per cent. variable
For younger persons, the increase was only 32 per cent.'7 Expenses age grou:
for hospital care accounted for $160 of the increase for the elderly, a partly be
rise of nearly 100 per cent. In the first year of the program, it seems The se
that as much as half of the increased hospital expense of $46 1966, wh
represented previous "charity" care.'8 After the first year, total various
expense continued to rise rapidly. aging pn
The Health Interview Surveys provide additional information on by coho:
the changes in use of health services by different age groups. The compare
relative increase in hospital care for the elderly represented higher follow C
admission rates and longer stays, as shown below,'9 Five rec
















All ages 128.3 8.3 125.6 9.1
Age 45—64 147.9 11.0 143.1 11.3
Age 65+ 186.3 12.7 232.6 15.3
ITY
wasa biased




























The increased discharge rate and mean stay for the elderly were
not uniform across disease categories. Certain diseases of the heart,
the largest single category of discharges, rose from 11.2 per cent of
discharges to 12.8 per cent. Other categories showing an increased
share of discharges were diseases of the eye, respiratory conditions,
arthritis, and diseases of bones and joints. Marked increases in
mean stay occurred for infective and parasitic diseases, mental and
personality disorders, and diseases of the nervous system. These
categories of increased hospital care suggest that declines in
mortality may be only a small part of health improvement.
Recently, econometric studies of mortality have dealt with re-
gional variation in age-specific or age-adjusted mortality rates. Dif-
ferences in environment, medical care, income, education, and
racial composition are taken to be causal determinants of differ-
ences in regional death rates. Auster, Leveson, and Sarachek (1969)
estimate an elasticity of mortality for whites with respect to health
expenditure of about —0.1, with a standard deviation almost as large
in absolute value. The independent effect of higher average income
seems to be an increase in average mortality. Silver (1972) found no
significant association between state and local government spend-
ing for health and mortality in SMSA's.
The quantitative information generated by these studies would
not seem applicable to the problem at hand—predictions by age of
mortality over time. A relationship with an age-adjusted dependent
variable cannot be an aggregate of the same relationship for each
age group.2° Moreover, an age-specific death rate changes over time
partly because it refers to different people with different histories.
The series in Figure 1 seems to display a change in trend after
1966, which can be compared with other age-specific series. Yet the
various age-specific series are not independent because of the
aging process. Biometricians often present mortality data organized
by cohort—i.e., the mortality rate for the same group of people
compared over time as the group ages. After age 35, cohorts seem to
follow Gompertz' Law—the logarithm of mortality is linear in age.2'
Five recentcohort curves are plotted in Figure 2.












































SOURCE:US. National Center for Health Statistics, as in Figu
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The Logarithm of Mortality as a Function of







Define the following variables:
rn1 =mortalityrate for cohort i in year t
a1 =theage of cohort i in year t
c, =acohort-specific constant
B =aconstant common to all cohorts
Then Figure 2 might be described with a cohort model that is a
complete reconstruction of independent time series,
(5)
inthe cohort model is suggested by data such
as in Figure 3, reprinted from Moriyama and Gustavus (1972). It
seems that more recent cohorts after age 35 have a lower c, and a
higher B;thatis, they begin at a lower rate but rise faster. A more
careful inspection of this phenomenon reveals a flaw in the pure
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White femalecohorts at the same date. In Figure 2, the older cohorts
seem to abruptly change slope after 1954.
A modification of the cohort model with a proportional shift in all
mortality rates at each date will now be discussed. Let mat be the
mortality rate for the group age a in year t, and let m_1 stand for
ma_it_i. Then suppose that
(6) mat=(1 Bm_i+uat
where Uat is a random disturbance with mean zero. Because each
is an observed relative frequency between 0 and 1, and because I eachobservation is for a group of different size, the disturbance / willbe heteroskedastic, but with easily estimated variance.22 A
further stochastic property ofis suggested in discussions of
epidemics—that Uat may be negatively correlated with UQI.1_I.
The model (6) was estimated by the established two-step,
generalized least squares procedure. Since 1969 is the latest year
for which mortality by five-year age interval is tabulated, the years
used are 1969, back by five-year intervals through 1934.23 In each
year ten age groups are used, the youngest being age Sepa-
rate analyses were made for white males and for white females.
A test of the effect of Medicare is whether the shift parameter, X,
for 1969 is significantly lower for the elderly than a separately
estimated value for the young.25 Since AB is an unrestricted linear
parameter in (6), significance tests may be easily obtained with the
t statistic. In Table 1 are the relevant parameter estimates. The
overall fit of the model is extremely close, and a maximum likeli-
hood search for a first-order negative correlation between Uag and
Ua_i,r_t produced too small a value to be meaningfully different
Cohort from zero.
The relative improvement for older white males in 1969 is
Cohort statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, while the hypothesis
of equal parameters in the female case cannot be rejected. Tables 2
TABLE1Estimates of Shift Coefficients XB for 1969




























































TABLE 2 Actual and Predicted Mortality Rates for










42 414 425 390 ± 10
47 688 685 628 16
52 1,133 1,108 1,044 28
57 1,801 1,774 1,720 46
62 2,694 2,758 2,734 73
67 4,104 4,010 4,089 198
72 5,876 6,107 6,230 165
77 8,402 8,557 8,919 237
82 12,698 12,191 12,754 339
'Midpoint of five-year interval.
and 3 compare actual mortality rates in 1969 with predicted values
derived by fitting through 1964 and assuming that A for 1969 will
be the same as for 1964. These comparisons have the same obvious
indications as the parameter tests.
It is puzzling that a gain for older men is apparent but not for
older women. Table 3 indicates that mortality was meaningfully
lower for older women in 1969 than in 1964, but there was also a
strong decrease predicted by cohort experience. The test for nega-










42 234 241 238 13
47 367 365 367 19
52 562 551 576 31











72 3,364 3,278 3,276 176
77 5,600 5,301 5,281 284
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tively autocorrelated residuals did not indicate misspecification of
Constant B in (6). The difference in result by sex will not be seen in
the disability data of the next section.
The extent of improvement in mortality for white males is not
immediately suitable for the welfare assessment in (4). If we take T
to be the sum of annual survival rates, then T will rise somewhat
less than in proportion to the fall in mortality. In particular, for a
mortality reduction of about 5 per cent at every age, suggested by
Table 1, w would be about 1.03. This ignores improvement in
health status of the living, to be discussed below.
4.DISABILITY AND THE CONSUMPTION OF HEALTH
SERVICES
Thissection reports a study of disability using interview data
collected by the National Center for Health Statistics. Reductions
in disability augment social welfare gains stemming from mortality
reduction, and the extent of one type of improvement might not be
easily inferred from the extent of the other.26
The first data to be examined are disability rates over
time, 1959—1971. The data suggest relative gains for older men and
women since 1965. The disability measure used here is the number
of restricted activity days, R, defined as days in which usual
activities are substantially reduced because of illness or injury.
In Figure 4, average R is plotted over time for four age-sex
classes. In the preceding section I stated that a set of age-specific
time series should not be treated as if each were independent.
Here, however, the age categories are too broad and the time series
too short to adequately treat the autoregressive properties of disa-
bility. Instead, it seems more plausible to test for a stable contem-
poraneous relationship between R and the utilization of health
services.
Annual expenditures on personal health care per capita have
been calculated by Cooperet at. (1973). These may be converted to
constant dollar units with the BLS price index for medical care.
Values of per capita real expense, PRE, for different age groups are
available after 1966. For this period, per capita real expense for
persons over age 65, PREA, has been regularly about 2.5 times PRE
for the entire population. Survey evidence for 1962 showed












































































SOURCE:U.S. National Center for Health Statistics.
Duringthe brief time period covered in Figure 4, there is not a
significant relationship between R and PRE for persons aged
45—64. For feniales, however, the trend lowers beginning in 1966,
which is almost significant.
For the elderly, the data support a significant relationship be-
tween R and PREA. The regression of R on PREA yields a coeffi-
cient estimate for men of —0.018 (t statistic —5.2), and for women
—0.013 (t statistic —3.4). If the effect of Medicare is taken to be the
rise in PREA from 1.5 PRE to 2.5 PRE, then in 1969 the program is
associated with a decline of 5.7 disability days for men and 4.1 days
for women. These declines would have been 18 per cent and 11 per
cent, respectively. These estimates are crude and upwardly biased
by the omission of variables such as income or social security cash
benefits, since other goods and services may be purchased that
reduce disability. Over a longer time series, the problem ofexogenous technical progress might be treated by distinguishing
cause-specific disability rates.
One possible means of combining information on disability
reduction with information on mortality reduction will now be
discussed. The aim is to construct a useful scalar measure of
relative improvement, co, to use in (4).
Recall that= where each T, is a factor multiplying the
annual expected utility of consumption of goods other than health
services. LetS1, be the probability of survival to year t under pro-
gram i. Let a1, be a factor that reduces utility of those alive depend-
ing on the level of average disability; specifically, let
disability days in year t
365
One particular way of formulating the planning agency's tradeoff
between survival and disability is
(7) T4=a11+
where=0 for all t > L. Perhaps the major reservation in advocat-
ing such a measure is a suspicion that it would not be appropriate
for situations wherein mortality increases despite improvements in
the health of the living. In the practical application here, changes in
mortality will be seen to govern the scalar index
In the following table (7) is used to compute values of a for men
and women aged 65—69 in 1969, r being the relative decline in
mortality rates and d the relative decline in disability days.
r d
Men
T w r d
Women
T w
0 0 11.32 0 0 16.44
.03 .10 11.64 1.028 .03 .10 16.87 1.026
.06 .10 11.85 1.047 .06 .10 17.13 1.042
.03 .20 11.75 1.038 .03 .20 17.04 1.036
.06 .20 11.97 1.057 .06 .20 17.31 1.052
The importance of disability and health status measures seems
destined to grow. Further use of the Health Interview Surveys will
treat disability as an outcome of environmental, events, the use of
medical services, and the lagged effects of past behavior. A pre-

















taken to be the
the program is
and 4.1 days




ie problem ofreported below. The results were not encouraging; they suggest
refinements in research methods and the need for longitudinal
samples.
Previously, Grossman (1972, pp. 55—66) has reported estimates of
the determinants of cross-sectional variation in disability. After
application of two models with disability as a dependent variable,
he suggests that the more convincing interpretation of the data is
given by a model of the demand for "flows" of good health.27
attempt to estimate with consistent methods the
effect of medical care in reducing disability did not yield reliable
results.28 My preliminary study led to a similar conclusion.,
The Health Interview Survey for 1969 provides the number of
restricted activity days for an individual during the two weeks prior
to interview. Each quarter of the year, however, is a separate
random sample of the U.S. population. Therefore,_average disabil-
ity for subpopulation iin a two-week period,is seasonally
unbiased. The method of choosing subpopulations will be consid-
ered below. The probability of a disabling condition does not
depend on contemporaneous use of medical care, and by analogy to
Gompertz' Law is assumed to rise exponentially with age. The
length of disability, given its occurrence, is assumed to depend
negatively on the intensity of medical care.
Define the following averages for subpopulation i:
MDV =numberof physician visits (12 mos.).
HOS =numberof hospital days (12 mos.)
HI =proportionwith hospital insurance
HG =proportionwith education at least through high school gradua-
tion
INS =0.25(HI) +(1-HI)a crude estimate of average net price of
medical care.
Let the prefix L for any variable name denote a logarithmic
transformation.
In the absence of data on past use of medical care, I attempted to
specify the static production function over groups
(8) LR, =+ + a2LMDVf + + a4LHGf +u1
Problems of identification and simultaneity bias must now be
discussed, and methods for grouping and consistent estimation
described. In reality, there are a variety of illnesses, each with a
different established method and intensity of medical treatment.
Some conditions that are treated with more than average intensity
may nevertheless have worse than average disability results,
which, of course, carries no implication that the choice of treatment






























personsg; they suggest was inefficient. One suspects, therefore, correlation between
for longitudinal amount of care and the residual in (8). Identifying information may
not be present in the sample—e.g., variables that affect MDV and
rted estimates of HOS but are not correlated with the residual in (8). I assumed that
disability. After income and price of care are variables that may be used as
mdent variable, instruments in estimating (8). Only a crude measure of price was
rn of the data is available.
)d health.27 The population over 45 was classified into 9 age categories and 7
nt methods the income groups, yielding 63 subpopulations. The grouping strategy,
ot yield reliable in addition to removing seasonality, sought to use an instrumental
iclusion. technique to purge LMDV and LHOS of correlations with is.
sthe number of Classification by age may not advance the above strategy, so (8) was
two weeks prior estimated by two-stage least squares with LINS, LHGP, ACE, and
r,is a separate income dummy variables used as the exogenous variables. The
'average disabil- computed estimates of a2 and a3 were positive, which seems pri-
isseasonally manly to reflect a failure to identify the true parameters of a produc-
will be consid- tion relation.
dition does not Fruifful research on cross-sectional variation in disability may be
nd by analogy to aided by cause-specific analysis, or supplementary information on
with age. The regional quality variation and standards of medical care. The
med to depend longer-term effects of differences in intensity or quality of medical
care may require repeated interviews with the same individuals.
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
gbschool gradua- It was not the purpose of this paper to conclude whether Medicare
is or was better than some other program. The purpose was to rage net price of ... . . demonstratethe feasibility of denying and usefully combining
information on health status, cash transfers, and risk bearing. The
a logarithmic social welfare function suggested in this paper is one of an infinity
of formulations. The need to use some such precise formulation for
e, I attempted to planning government intervention in personal health decisions
seems obvious.
+Uj
ismust now be NOTES ;tentestimation
;es, each with a 1.The dominant private insurance plans also cover health loss with a matching
dical treatment. The welfare foniiulation in this paper is not meant to explain how the
verage intensity private insurance system, or Medicare arose, but may be relevant to the
question of why they survive. sability results, 2.The effect of higher taxes and higher prices for health services on younger
)ice of treatment persons will not be considered.
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T
3.Despite the short time span, the data suggest a break in trend after 1965 that is cancer.
consistent with a stable relationship between real per capita health expense prices n
and days of restricted activity. A cross-section multivariate analysis in 1969, treatmei
however, did not permit the identification of such a "production" relationship. leeway
4.See H. Somers and A. Somers, Medicare and the Hospitals: Issues and respons
Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), Ch. I. 16.An early
5.Each person who votes may weigh his own potential gain or loss against the Change
gain or loss of others. Pauly (1971) suggests that the existence of such Statisti
consumption externalities is the key impetus behind public reimbursement 17.During
programs for medical care. In the general analysis of government there will be The exr
many SWF's. Rothenberg (1961) argues that the community can come to a prior 18.See R.
agreement on a single SWF to be implemented by neutral technocrats. Aged,"
6.The problem of adverse selection and other high private transaction costs argue 19.The uti
for public administration of insurance, but this is not synonymous with the Illness,
application of a SWF. 20.This pa
7.The exposition may be carried through with an addition to y of the annuity all the i
value of other assets as long as these are unaffected by program change. Also, c Silver
is assumed to be non-negative, regions
8.The same objective function may be offered with the following justification: 1960, a
Assume that each period has independent and identically distributed outcomes 21.Since C
of current expense and that individual utility is the sum of utility in all periods have b
lived. Then, average summed utility will be mortali
E[u(c)]'(l+S+S,+...)
22.Iftheti
where S) is the probability of survival to period j, averaging over all initial numbe:
conditions. 23.I must
9.Both criteria are weighted sums of future planner-perceived gains to the assistan
representative individual. Use of the human capital criterion does not typically 24.The op
recognize risk preference. See, e.g., Weisbrod (1961) and Rice (1966). Both 25.A three
criteria override individual preferences with regard to discounting the future, serious
and individual subjective probabilities. Discounting could be incorporated in availab
the SWF used here. change
10.The concept is analogous to "certainty equivalence." Therefore, extrapolation propoil
to situations with no risk would suffer from a recognized drawback—consumer greater
may be somewhat incomparable between the case of no risk and 26.Fuchs
some risk. measui
11.The specification of Constant R has been applied in discussions of health United
insurance by Zeckhauser (1970), Friedman (1971), Felclstein (1972), and Arrow possibi
(1974). ages rn
12.Suppose that T is the sum of survival rates given in an earlier note. If the entire 27.Of prin
survival curve is shifted up by proportion r > 1, then w is slightly less than r; capitali
specifically, 28.The
with so
13.This conclusion may depend on the precise manner of treating free care in the
pre-Medicare period. The appropriate z1 distribution is what would have been
observed in the year for which all comparisons are made, in this paper 1969.
14.Elderly persons were likely to have insurance with less extensive reimburse- REFERENC
ment,but were likely to be paying higher premiums for individual coverage.
In 1969 they might have been paying more than this amount in the absence of 1.Auster,
Medicare.
15.This distinction may have practical relevance for a minority of diseases such as
382
IFriedman 383 Mcancer. The distinction attempts to recognize that consumer response to lower
prices may be more directly relevant to early treatment than to the mode of
treatment. The behavior of physicians as decision-making agents with some
leeway to exercise their own preferences may show a more complicated
response to public programs. See Fuchs (1972, Ch. 4) and Friedman (1974).
16.An early example in the literature on economic growth is R. Solow, "Technical
Change and the Aggregate Production Function," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 39 (1957), pp. 312—320.
17.During this period the CPI medical care component rose by about 15 per cent.
The expenditure data are from Cooper et al. (1973).
18.See R. Lowenstein, "Early Effects of Medicare on the Health Care of the
Aged," Social SecurityBulletin (April1971).
19.The utilization data in this section are from "Age Patterns in Medical Care,
Illness, and Disability," Vital and Health Statistics, Series 10, Nos. 32 and 70.
20.This particular problem could be corrected in the linear case by age-adjusting
all the independent variables. The question of proper pooling is more serious.
Silver computes a coefficient of concordance between separate rankings of
regions for age-specific mortality. The values for this statistic are quite low in
1960, and are more troubling for men than for women.
21.Since Gompertz' initial suggestion, more complicated models and speculations
have been offered. For most of these formulations, the rate of increase in
mortality is approximately constant from "maturity," falling off gradually at
older ages. See Spiegelman (1968), pp. 163—170.
22.If the true value of mat isthen the variance
atbeginning of year t.
23.I must thank Joan Kiebba, National Center for Health Statistics, for helpful
assistance with these data.
24.The open-ended group, age 85+, was ignored.
25. A three-year period may be too soon to capture the effect of earlier treatment of
serious illness, as the trend in Figure 1 suggests. When later data become
available, the possibility must be considered that technical or environment
change has been slanted in favor of the elderly. For example, a decline in the
proportion of cigarette smokers may have occurred more rapidly and with
greater effect among the elderly.
26.Fuchs has discussed the extent of correlation between mortality and disability
measures across regions. See "Some Economic Aspects of Mortality in the
United States," National Bureau of Economic Research, 1965, mimeo. The
possibility should not be overlooked that over time, reduced mortality at older
ages might raise the average observed disability of the living.
27.Of primary interest to Grossman is the stock of health that represents both the
capitalization of future flows and the lagged effects of past investment choices.
28.The regression used a NORC sample of 550 members of the labor force in 1963
with some disability days.
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Bernard Friedman's paper is really two very interesting papers. Unfortunately,
the bridge between them is not as strong as it could be. The firstis an
application of welfare theory to provide a framework for analyzing Medicare.
The second is an empirical investigation of the effects of Medicare on the
health status of the aged.In these brief comments the model and its
assumptions are reviewed, other important issues to consider are identified,
and the empirical results are examined,
Friedman proposes an intriguing model to compare the welfare of the aged
before and after Medicare. The novel aspect of the model is the attempt to
incorporate three health-related features into the welfare function. They are (1)
consumption of medical services, (2) risk spreading, and (3) health status.
The concept of "equivalent transfer,"r, which purports to measure the
monetary value of welfare gains in these three features, is developed. One
of the basic ramifications of the modelisthatallwelfare gains are
attributed to Medicare.
The modelisa two-period life-cycle formulation.Itassumes that a
representative individual (in period 1) saves out of current income. At the
critical age (period 2), all saving ends and the individual receives an annuity
and a reimbursement contract for the purchase of medical services.1 Future
consumption of goods and services is governed by two other variables: (1) Z,
a random variable reflecting out-of-pocket expenses for noncovered medical
services, and (2) ir, average spending on health insurance premiums, both
public and private. Assuming no borrowing, lending, or saving, consumption
of goods and services other than medical care, C, is defined by the identity2
C =y—ir—Z.
With this consumption identity, Friedman specifies an objective function. It
is T E [u(c)J, the product of average health status T as perceived by the
central planning authority and the expected value of a utility function u(c).
Friedman comments that this objective function is "the social perception of
individual welfare at the critical age." To compare welfare of the aged before
and after Medicare, Friedman incorporates the equivalent transfer r into the
objective function. The definition of 'r is embodied in the following equation
T2'E[u(c2—r)] =T1 .E[u(c)}
The authors are Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Planning and Evaluation, and St aft Economist, De-
partment of Health. Education, and Welfare. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the views of the Department. The authors would like to especially acknowledge the helpful
comments of George Schleber.
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where subscripts1and 2 refer to pre- and post-Medicare, respectively. Medicare. CI
Friedman describes T as "the amount of nonmedical consumption whose loss housing subs
in situation 2 leaves the objective function at the same value as in situation i.' income (Sod
Positing a negative exponential utility function with the property of constant Two tests a
absolute risk aversion, Friedman solves the above equation for r. mortality datt
The model is an intriguing conceptual approach that incorporates the for white mal
consumption of medical services,risk spreading, and health statusin mortality for
comparing the welfare of the aged before and after Medicare. However, in retrogression
examining Medicare (or other public programs) there are some other Impor- The seconi
tant issues to consider. For example, under what circumstances should the up to 1964. T'
government intervene in the private market? If government intervenes, what would have I
policy instruments should be employed? What are the total(i.e., general the effect of
equilibrium) effects of intervention on the rest of society? Friedman's formula- different fror
tion does not address itself to these fundamental issues, males there i
In the case of Medicare, one key reason for public intervention was the 65 in 1969
failure of the private market to provide health insurance for the elderly. Largely significantly
out of the labor force, the elderly lacked the opportunity to purchase health 62)
insurance at group rates. In addition, experience rating, the competitive tool Although
of the commercial companies, forced the Blues to abandon community rating, view of the i
which to a certain extent had allowed some aged persons to purchase attribute imp
protection at reasonable rates. Finally, an institutional feature of the market is many other s
that unlikeinsurance, one cannot purchase health insurance on an annuity may also be
basis. For these reasons an adequate market for health insurance for the aged health status,
failed to develop. Distributional considerations provide yet another, albeit .might be affi
interrelated, rationale for the creation of Medicare, since many elements of Since impr
society had empathy with the elderly, a majority of whom are poor. If these the health of
distributional considerations are viewed in a more global framework, one model, Fried
should consider the welfare of the givers as well as the receivers.3 capita expe
Inasmuch as public intervention can lead to greater efficiency under these Friedman su
circumstances, the question becomes, "What policies should be used?" disability da
When Medicare was being debated, several approaches—subsidies for the should beii
purchase of private insurance, creation of insurance pools, and having the omitted from
government act as underwriter—were considered.It would be useful to care" in the
develop a model to compare the implications, of these alternative Friedmant
mechanisms. Such a model could also be useful in addressing some of the likely range
important questions in the current national health insurance debate. . possible set
The second part of Friedman's paper is an empirical investigation of specification
whether the health status of the elderly improved after Medicare. Indeed, more helpful
these results are encouraging, although they are far from definitive. First, he Medicare for
attempts to measure improvements inmortality. Because this measure disability. Ut
ignores improvements in the health status of the living, changes in disability calculate 'r,
are also measured, Finally, mortality and disability are integrated to obtain a In summa.
comprehensive indicator of the change in health status. welfare effec
Friedman acknowledges the problem of attempting to discern causality results can I
with aggregate mortality data but aspires to a less grand objective of finding Nevertheless
an associative relationship. The critical assumption of this approach is thata// other import
the change in health statusisattributed exclusively to one program—
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Medicare. Changes in health status arising from other programs such as
housing subsidies, food stamps, cleaner environments, and increases in real
income (Social Security benefits) are not properly accounted for.
Two tests of improvement in mortality of the aged are performed with cohort
mortality data. In the first test a modified cohort mortality model is estimated
for white males and females. Although the model indicates improvements in
mortality for white males, the hypothesis of no improvement or indeed
retrogression in mortality for white females cannot be rejected.
The second test applies the model to mortality data for each of eight cohorts
up to 1964. The estimated equation is then used to predict what 1969 mortality
would have been if the underlying pre-Medicare trends continued. A test of
the effect of Medicare is whether the actual 1969 mortality rate is significantly
different from the predicted 1969 mortality. Friedman finds that for white
males there is a significant difference for six cohorts (four cohorts under age
65 in 1969 and the oldest two over 65). For white females, the actual is
significantly different from the predicted for only one of the nine cohorts (age
62).
Although these results are encouraging, they are hardly unambiguous. In
view of the insignificant result for white females,it may be premature to
attribute improvements in mortality for males to Medicare, especially since so
many other social programs were changing at the same time. In any case, it
may also be that a three-year period is too short to detect improvements in
health status, especially for the aged, who have many chronic conditions that
might be affected only slightly by medical care.
Since improvements in mortality do not take into account improvements in
the health of the living, changes in disability are also considered. In a crude
model, Friedman regresses days of restricted activity for the aged on real per
capita expenditures for the aged and reports highly significant results.
Friedman suggests that in 1969 Medicare is "associated with a decline of 5.7
disability days for men and 4.1 disability days for women." These results
should be interpreted cautiously since other important variables may be
omitted from the model. Moreover, there is a problem of causality, and "free
care" in the pre-Medicare period may not be adequately accounted for.
Friedman then attempts to combine mortality and disability to determine the
likely range of the relative improvement in health status. He uses one of many
possible sets of assumptions, and in view of the value judgments this
specification presumes, several alternative combinations might have been
more helpful. Friedman computes the relative improvement in health after
Medicare for several possible values of the improvement in mortality and
disability. Unfortunately, he does not use the relative improvement in health to
calculate r, the dollar value of welfare gains.
In summary, Friedman has presented an interesting model to analyze the
welfare effects of Medicare on beneficiaries. To the extent that his empirical
results can be attributed to Medicare, they reflect favorably on the program.
Nevertheless, the model is limited in applicability and leaves untested many
other important aspects of a national health financing system.
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NOTES A closeexa
1.That is; the Medicare reimbursement contract reimburses eligible persons for specified medical deviation betw
services if these services are rendered by recognized providers, relative deviati
2.It is unclear how this model relates to the institutional features of Medicare. For example, Part A
1below
of Medicare (primarily for institutional services) is mandatory and is financed by a payroll tax on
employers and currently employed workers. Benefits are paid out of current income and indeed p ,,g
this feature may be viewed as an intergenerational transfer of wealth. Part B (primarily for care effect, bu
noninstitutional services) is a voluntary program financed by premiums set annually and paid by between the ol
both the beneficiary and government general revenues. Indeed, one can make an analogy real phenomen
between the government and private employers if we consider Part B as a large group policy increasing age
with premiums paid by both enrollees and by government contributions. But the
I
3.See especially Irwin Garfinkel, "Is In-Kind Redistribution Efficient?." Quarterly .Journal of
.COflC Ii
Economics, 87 (May 1973), pp. 320—330. Friedman s
can be followe
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and Stanford University regressions of
1965 and 196
Ishall limit my comments to Friedman's attempt to determine the effect of difference bet
Medicare on mortality. This is, as he points out, a hazardous undertaking. The I have also I
available data cover only three full post-Medicare years, 1967—1 969, possibly the Medicare
too short a period for any significant changes in mortality to emerg'e. In the predicted valt
short run death rates are subject to many random influences such as evidence that
influenza epidemics or variations in the severity of winter weather. aged.
Even if a longer period were available, however, the problem of establish- . I do not find
ing a causal connection between Medicare and mortality change would be view, are dete
formidable. For the population as a whole, long-run trends in mortality are the 1960s, for
determined primarily by environmental and behavioral changes and by
advances in medical technology, not by changes in quantity of medical care.
From 1900 to the mid-i 930s, age-adjusted mortality of U.S. whites decreased TABLE 1
at an average rate of about 1.3 per cent per year. The decline, which was only
slightly more rapid for females than for males, was mostly the result of rising
real income and of basic public health measures. Very little was attributable
to advances in medical science or increased quantity of medical care.
From the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s, age-adjusted death rates fell at a Age
much faster rate: 1.7 per cent per year for white males and 2.9 per cent per
__________
year for white females. The acceleration was the result of rapid advances in 42
medical technology, particularly the development of anti-infectious drugs. 47
Around 1954—1955 there was an abrupt change in trend (pointed out by 52
Friedman in his cohort charts). Since then, the age-adjusted male death rate 57
has been approximately constant. The female rate has continued to decline 62
but at a much slower pace: 0.7 per cent annually. 67
To test for the effects of Medicare, Friedman employs a cohort model with
observations at five-year intervals back to 1934. Regressions through 1964
82
yield predicted age-specific mortality for 1969 that he compares with actual
mortality. He finds a significant result for males but not for females. souRcE: Table2i
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A close examination of Friedman's Table 2 reveals a curious pattern of
deviation between actual and predicted mortality rates in 1969, with the
relative deviation decreasing systematically with age, as shown in my Table
1below.
By splitting the population at age 65, Friedman finds a significant "Medi-
care effect," but if the population were split at 55 or 75, a significant difference
between the older and younger ages would also emerge. There may be some
real phenomena at work that are systematically reducing mortality more with
increasing age, or the pattern may result from some bias in the cohort model.
But the conclusion of a Medicare effect seems premature.
Friedman's cohort model is only one of several imperfect approaches that
can be followed to test for Medicare effects. The mortality of any population in
a given year is a function of its age, the state of medical science, the quantity
of care available, the current environment, plus a host of past medical and
environmental variables and previous mortality experience. Because cohort,
age, and year are linked in an identity relationship,itis not possible to
completely identify their separate effects.
Ihave attempted to test for a Medicare effect on mortality by fitting
regressions of the form In M =a +bT to annual data for the periods 1955—
1965 and 1967_1969.1 In no case can we reject the null hypothesis of no
difference between the periods. The F values are typically very small.
I have also used the 1955—1965 regressions to derive predicted values for
the Medicare years. The percentage difference between the actual and the
predicted values for these years is shown in Table 2. Again, there is no
evidence that Medicare has had a significant effect on the mortality of the
aged.
I do not find this result very surprising. Current changes in mortality, in my
view, are determined primarily by nonmedical factors. During the decade of
the 1960s, for instance, the death rate for emphysema for white males ages
TABLE 1RelativeDeviationbetween
Actual Mortality and Friedman's












SOURCE:Table 2 in Friedman's paper.
389 Mortality, Disability, and MedicareTABLE 2 Percentage Deviation between Actual and
Predicted Death Rates, 1967-1 969a
. 'Average









































'Predicted values based on regressions fitted to annual data. 1955—1965.
65—74 more than doubled, the rate for lung cancer increased by 25 per cent,
and the rate for arteriosclerotic heart disease went up by 15 per cent. These
increases were not the result of a deterioration in the quantity or quality of
medical care. During the same decade there were substantial (more than 25
per cent) decreases in the death rates for cancer of the large intestine, rectum,
and prostate. The medical profession has no firm explanation for these
declines and they are not believed to be the result of more medical care.
To pursue seriously the question of the effect of Medicare on mortality,
several different approaches should be tried. For instance,it would be
desirable to disaggregate by cause of death. Particular attention could then
be paid to those categories wherein there is some reason to believe that
increased access to medical care should make a difference (e.g., infectious
diseases). It might also be useful to disaggregate by state and region. There
was probably some geographic variationin the impact of Medicare on
utilization of care by the aged, and one could test for a relation between such
utilization and changes in mortality. Along the same Ilnes, it might be useful to
look at recent mortality experience in countries that did not experience any
shift in care for the elderly.
These comments, which have been limited to mortality, do not do justice to
the ambitious scope of Friedman's paper. They reflect my own belief in the



























1.The year 1966 is omitted because Medicare was partially in effect.
M = age.sex.specilic death rates
Ttime